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Abstract: We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one 
licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee 
is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses private 
information about the market demand which is unknown to the patentee except for some prior belief 
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1. Introduction 
Patent licensing is fairly common that takes place in almost all industries. It is a source of 
profit for the inventor (also called patentee) who earns rent through licensing a patent. The 
common modes of patent licensing are: a royalty  on  per unit of output produced with the 
patented technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity produced with the 
patented technology, or a combination of fixed fee and r oyalty. The patentee can choose 
which of these modes of licensing to employ. That is, she can decide on whether to set a 
royalty rate and/or a fixed fee for which any firm can purchase a license or auction a fixed 
number of licenses. Th e objective of the patentee is to maximize profits through licensing. In 
the patent licensing literature, depending on patentee’s position in the market, generally two 
cases are discussed. One, where the patentee is outside the market of operation i.e. the 
patentee is not a competitor in the product market and two, where the patentee is inside the 
market of operation and naturally becomes a competitor in the product market. Given these 
two possible situations, the results regarding optimal licensing is rather interesting.  In a  
complete information framework, i f the patentee happens to be  an   outsider, a fixed fee 
licensing is better than per unit royalty licensing (see Kamien and Tauman (1986), Katz and 
Shapiro (1986), Kamien et. al. (1992), Kamien (1992) among others) and the reverse happen 
when the patentee is an insider i.e. a competitor (see Wang (1998), Poddar and Sinha (2001)).  
Given this theoretical finding, in reality, then  one should expect that either a fixed licensing 
or a per unit royalty licensing contract is being  offered by the patentee to the licensee 
depending  on  whether the patentee is an outsider or insider. But empirical facts say 
otherwise1, e.g. Rostoker (1983) in a firms survey finds out royalty plus fixed fee licensing 
accounts for 46 percent of the licens ing arrangements, royalty alone 39 percent and fixed fee 
alone 13 percent. Similar studies by Taylor and Silberston (1973) find that arrangements with 
royalties or a mixture of fixed fee and royalty are far more common than a simple fee. In this 
paper, we try to find out a plausible theoretical explanation of this empirically observed fact 
in licensing arrangements.   
  We consider a simple model of asymmetric information with adverse selection. There 
is one patentee and one potential licensee. The patentee  holds a patent for a cost reducing 
technology and wishes to license it with an objective to maximize its own profit. The licensee 
is the only firm operating in the product market. The patentee is an outsider. The licensee has 
the private information regarding the market demand (whether it i s high or low) whereas the 
                                                   
1 See also Caves et al. (1983), Macho-Stadler et al. (1996), Jensen and Thursby (2001) among others.   2 
patentee  has  only  a prior belief about it. The patentee wants to offer an optimal  linear 
2 
licensing contract for two possible demand situations (high or low) to the licensee, and hence 
faces an  adverse selection problem. The licensee has always an incentive to convince the 
patentee that  the demand  condition is low in order to pay lower  price for the license as 
compared to the high demand situation (since high demand state generates more surplus to 
the licensee, which in turn increases the license fee). Given this adverse selection problem, 
we explore what would be an optimal as well as an efficient linear licensing contract offered 
by the patentee. We believe many real-life licensing arrangements are similar to the situation 
described here.  Notice that without any asymmetric information, i.e. in a complete 
information framework  of the model, charging a fixed fee (i.e. high fee for the high demand 
and low fee or the low demand) would be clearly optimal for the patentee. However, with 
adverse selection, we show that the optimal licensing involves royalty, fixed fee and a 
combination of both depending on the parameter configurations of our model. 
  The studies which also try to explain the prevalence of per unit royalty or a mixture of 
royalty and fixed fee as a licensing contract when the patentee is an outsider are Beggs 
(1992),  Gallini and Wright (1990), Choi (2001)
3 among others.
4 Beggs (1992) examined a 
situation where the licensee has a very clear idea of the market for a new product or the 
reduction in costs from a new process, hence possesses private information about the actual 
value of the patent which the patentee does not know. In this context he mainly considers a 
signaling game and shows that royalty contracts make a separating equilibrium possible, and 
may allow a more efficient outcome than a fixed fee licensing. However, our model is one of 
screening one (not signaling), where the patentee offers licensing contract to the licensee 
while facing the problem of adverse selection. While in Beggs, the licensee makes a single 
offer to the patentee in order to signal about the possessed private information of the true 
value of the patent. On the other hand, Gallini and Wright (1990) considers another signaling 
game where the patentee has private information about the actual value of the patent and 
explained that royalty rate in the contract can act as a signaling device for the patentee. This 
is again in contrast to our model, where the private information about the market demand  in 
                                                   
2 From empirical facts and observations, it is quite evident that linear scheme of technology licensing is very 
much prevalent in reality (see previous discussion).  
3 Very recently, Choi (2001) considered a moral hazard problem in a licensing relationship where effective 
transmission of knowledge (i.e value of the patent) requires costly inputs by both dispensing and receiving 
parties which may not be observable to any other party, and explains the prevalence of royalty contract in the 
licensing relationship. 
4 Bousquet et. al. (1998) considered a licensing arrangement under demand or cost uncertainty and justified the 
use of royalty in addition to fixed fee using risk-related considerations. In their model they do not have any 
asymmetric information.    3 
our case lies with the licensee and patentee has only some prior belief about it. Finally, to the 
best of our knowledge in the patent licensing literature, this kind of screening problem of the 
patentee is never considered explicitly. Here we make an attempt to fill this gap.   
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework. Section 
3 describes two pooling licensing contracts: fixed fee and fixed fee plus royalty. Section 4 
improves upon the previous contracts and describes a separating licensing contract. Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
We consider a model of technology licensing with one patentee and one licensee. The 
patentee holds a patent for a cost reducing technology. There is an incumbent firm in the 
market, which is the potential licensee for this technology. The patentee cannot enter into the 
market and produce the product. Thus we consider the case of an outside patentee, for 
example an R& D Laboratory. We are interested in the linear optimal licensing strategy of the 
outside patentee with one potential licensee, who has private information about the market 
demand condition. 
The market (inverse) demand function is given by q A p - = , where p and q denote 
price and quantity respectively whereas A is the demand intercept. There can be two states of 
demand of the product under consideration: high or low.  We capture this fact by assuming 
that the intercept term A can take two values Ah and Al depending on  whether the demand is 
high(h) and low(l) (naturally Ah > Al). The incumbent firm has private information about this 
demand conditions i.e., it knows for sure whether the market demand is high or low. On the 
other hand the patentee being an outsider does not know the actual demand but has a prior 
belief about these demands. With  probability q, the patentee believes that the demand is low 
and with probability  ( ) q - 1  it believes the demand is high. q is common knowledge to both 
parties. 
Suppose the incumbent firm can serve the market with its existing technology for 
which t he marginal cost of production  is  c. However the patentee has a new technology 
which is more efficient and it reduces the cost of production by  e (e>0). Thus , if this new 
technology is used for the production, the marginal cost of production would be ( ) e - c . We 
consider the licensee to be high type or low type depending on whether it knows the demand 
to be high or low respectively.    4 
We consider the following game. The patentee makes an offer of the new technology by 
charging some payment schedule. The licensee can accept or reject the offer. After this the 
production is undertaken by the licensee either with the new technology (if it has accepted the 
offer) or with the existing technology (in case it has rejected the offer). The p rofit is realized 
at the end of the game.  
Let us note some of the variables, which would be useful for subsequent calculations. 
Since the licensee is the only one firm in the market so the market is served under monopoly. 
The reservation payoff for each type of the licensee is the payoff it receives without the new 
technology, 
i.e.,  Ri = 
4
) (
2 c Ai -
   for each i = h or l                             (1) 
And the corresponding output is  i q  =   
2
) ( c Ai -
   for i =h or l. 
Suppose the new technology is used for production then the profit of the firm would be  
4
) (
2 e + - c Ai  for i =h or l 




2 r c Ai - + - e
 and the corresponding output would be  
qi (r) = 
2
) ( r c Ai - + - e
 for i =h or l.  
 It is well known in the literature that the royalty is distortionary as it increases the marginal 
cost of production leading to lower overall surplus that can be divided between the patentee 
and the licensee. Suppose both the patentee and the licensee knows the actual demand in the 
market. Then the game is one of complete information. Then the optimal licensing strategy in 
this case is to charge a fixed fee such that the licensee receives its reservation payoff. Thus 




2 e + - c Ai – 
4
) (
2 c Ai -
 depending on i = h or l.                    (2) 
 
3. Pooling contracts 
3.1 Fixed Fee  
Let us consider the asymmetric information problem where the licensee has the private 
information about demand and the patentee has only prior belief about that.  Due to this    5 
asymmetric information the patentee will face an adverse selection problem in licensing the 
technology as the high type licensee would like to hide its private information and pretend to 
be low type in order to pay lower amount for the technology.  First consider the simplest 
contract which is the fixed fee licensing contract. If the patentee charges only fixed fee for its 
license, then either it has to charge Tl and in that case both type of the licensee will accept the 
license, or it has to charge Th, in that case only high type will accept the technology, and the 
low type will reject the offer.  Thus, if the patentee charges Tl, then the total payoff it receives 
is Tl. On the other hand if the patentee charges Th, then only the high type accepts the offer 
and the low type will not accept the license.  
Thus, the expected payoff would be: q.0 + (1-q)Th ( ) h T q - = 1  
Now depending on the prior belief about the type of the licensee, the patentee will choose 
either of these two license fees which maximize its payoff. A simple calculation shows that 





) such that for q ‡ q* both types of the licensee is offered the 
technology and the low fixed fee is charged. And for  q < q* only high type is offered the 
license and the high fixed fee is charged. Thus, for q < q* the market is not going to be 
served with the new technology if the market demand is truly low. Only the high type of the 
licensee accepts the offer and serves the market. So there is an inefficiency due to asymmetric 
information as the market is not served by new technology with probability q  for the prior 
belief  q <  q*.  The patentee’s payoff  p =Max. [ Tl, (1-q)Th].  In this context, w e define 
efficiency as a situation where the new technology is used to serve the market irrespective of 
the prior belief of the patentee.5  Thus, we have our first proposition, 
 
Proposition 1   
Suppose the patentee charges only fixed fee for licensing its technology. Then, for  q ‡ q* the 
patentee charges Tl as fixed fee and both types of the licensee accept the offer.  For q <q*, 
the patentee charges Th and only the high type licensee accepts the offer, and as a result the 
market is not served by new technology with all prior belief q < q* i.e. when  the market 
demand is truly low. 6  
                                                   
5 Note that this is different from the notion of social efficiency (i.e. social surplus maximization). However, the 
relationship between the two will be discussed at the end of section 4. 
6 This case is similar to what is mentioned in Beggs (1992, page 174). The only difference with Beggs is that 
when the license is offered with high fixed fee in case of rejection by the low type, the patentee has a fall back 
payoff which is nonzero (unlike zero in our case) as the patentee can turn to some other alternative licensee as 
assumed there.  Although Beggs had mentioned about the royalty contract which is contingent on the output   6 
Now, we would like to introduce more general kind of contract, which is a linear function of 
output having both fixed and a variable component. This kind of linear contract is very 
common in the context of technology licensing in practice.  
 
3.2 Fixed fee plus Royalty Contract 
We consider royalty as per unit fee charged on the output produced by the licensee and the 
fixed fee is a lump sum payment independent of output.  We consider a uniform payment 
scheme the patentee designs for licensing the technology. S uppose the patentee designs a 
linear  contract F + r q where F is the fixed fee and r is the royalty per unit of output 
produced.  This payment schedule is uniform irrespective of the licensee’s type. However, if 
the licensee produces more output which is expected in case of high demand then the ex-post 
payment to the patentee is more because of the royalty rate r. This is a pooling contract as the 
same contract  ( ) r F,  is offered to both types of the agent (licensee). 
With the pooling contract the patentee’s problem is to maximize its payoff  
)) ( )( 1 ( )) ( ( r rq F r rq F h l + - + + = q q p                (3) 
subject to the participation constraints of both types of the licensee given by (using (1)),  
 - F + 
4
) (




2 c Ai -
  for i = h and l.                       (PC) 
Given this problem it is easy to see that the high type licensee would receive some rent and 
the participation constraint of the low type would be satisfied with equality under this pooling 








2 c Al -
. 
Substituting this F and also  ql(r), qh(r) into p atentee’s payoff p (from 3) , we find patentee’s 








2 c Al -
+ q r.
2
) ( r c Al - + - e
 + (1-q).r.
2
) ( r c Ah - + - e
          (4) 
Now maximizing p (r) with respect to r we get optimal royalty under pooling contract as 
r = (1-q) (Ah – Al).  
Since the fixed  fee can never be negative (i.e. F ‡ 0) so given the participation constraint 
(PC) the royalty rate can never be greater than  e.  
                                                                                                                                                             
produced, in the similar set up like ours, but his non-linear royalty contract ultimately in this simple case turned 
out to be like fixed fee contract as analyzed above.   7 
Thus the optimal royalty rate under pooling contract r* = Min.[(1-q) (Ah – Al), e].  
As a result, F is also determined. 
Putting the value of r* and F, we get the patentee’s payoff under pooling contract p (r*). The 
following lemma characterizes the royalty scheme r* under pooling contract. 
 
Lemma 1  







 such that for q £  1 q  the optimal royalty rate is e and for  q > 1 q  the 
optimal royalty rate is   ) )( 1 ( l h A A - -q  < e.  
 
Alternative to the above pooling contract the patentee can  only offer license to the high type 
licensee and charge the high fixed fee Th (using (2)). In this case the patentee’s payoff would 
be (1-q) Th. Now comparing the payoffs we get the optimal strategy of the patentee. Note that 
there exists  qˆ = (1-
h T
r*) ( p
) such that for  q  ‡ q ˆ both types of the licensee is offered the 
technology with both fixed fee (F ‡ 0) and royalty payment (r*)7. And for q <q ˆ only high 
type is offered the license and the high fixed fee (Th) is charged. The patentee’s payoff under 
this pooling contract is:  ( ) ( ) ( ) h
P T r Max q p p - = 1 , .
*  
Thus, the following proposition characterizes the licensing strategy under pooling contract.  
 
Proposition 2   
(i)  When the technology is offered under pooling contract of royalty plus fixed fee 
then for q ‡ q ˆ the patentee offers the new technology to both types of the licensee. 
And for q <q ˆ the patentee offers the technology to the high type only by charging 
the high fixed fee. 
(ii)  When the technology is offered to both types, expected profit of the patentee under 
the pooling contract of royalty plus fixed fee, is higher than the earlier simple 
fixed fee contract. Formally, p(r*) > l T  . 
(iii)  Under the pooling contract of  royalty plus fixed fee  inefficiency is reduced as 
compared to the situation when only the fixed fee licensing is offered sinceq ˆ<q* . 
                                                   
7 Note that if r* = e, then F=0 ; otherwise F>0.   8 
In other words, under the pooling contract of royalty plus fixed fee, the market is 
being served for greater range of prior belief than simple fixed fee contact. 
 
Proof (i) Follows from above discussion.  (ii)  Note that p(0) = Tl and p(r) is a positive 
function of r when 
* 0 r r < < . (iii) Notice the fact that p(r*) > l T  . 
 
Corollary 1 (consistency with complete information): 
Observe that  under pooling contract when  q=1 (i.e., the demand is known to be low) then 
0 *= r  and  ( ) l T r = * p ; whereas when  q 0 = (i.e., the demand is known to be high) then 
( ) h h T T = -q 1  . 
 
Now the question is whether the patentee can do any better by designing a separating contract 
and what happens to the efficiency as a result of that.   
 
4. Separating Contract  
Suppose the patentee can offer a discriminatory contract between the two types of licensee. 
Note that this kind of separating contract must satisfy another two constraints apart from the 
participation constraints (PC). These are incentive compatibility constraints.  Suppose, the 
contract offered to the licensee is (Fl, rl) and (Fh, rh) to low type and high type respectively 
and the respective type accepts the offer.  Now the incentive compatibility means that neither 
type would mimic and accepts the contract meant for the other type.  So we write the 
following incentive compatibility constraints for the low type (IC1) and the high type (IC2) 
respectively.  




l l r c A - + - e




h l r c A - + - e
         (IC1) 




h h r c A - + - e




l h r c A - + - e
        (IC2) 
 
First note that any ( Fl, rl) must satisfy the participation constraint of the low type. Now by 
mimicking to be low type the high type licensee would get the RHS of (IC2). It is easy to 
check that high type gets a rent above its reservation payoff by mimicking to be low type 
licensee. Thus, to separate out the high type, (Fh, rh) must be such that the high type gets that 
rent in equilibrium. Since royalty has distortionary effects on surplus, so reducing  rh to zero   9 
and increasing Fh (subject to IC2) would increase the surplus extracted by the patentee. This 
mechanism does not violate the (IC1) also. As a result, F h =  Fl +
4
) (




l h r c A - + - e
 (from (IC2). Since the participation constraint of the low type will be 









2 c Al -
                                                                                        (5) 
Thus, the patentee’s payoff p  becomes a function of  l r  only, and we write:  
h l l l l l F r q r F r ) 1 ( )] ( [ ) ( q q p - + + =                                                                                                 (6) 
Therefore, the maximization of  ( ) l r p with respect to rl would yield rl = 
q
q ) )( 1 ( l h A A - -
.  
However, we have already noted that rl cannot exceed e.  
Thus, the optimal rl* = Min.[
q
q ) )( 1 ( l h A A - -
, e]. 
As a result the corresponding Fl* and Fh* are also determined. Hence the Patentee’s payoff 
under separating contract is achieved from (6). 
The following lemma characterizes the royalty scheme 
*
l r  under  separating contract with 
fixed fee plus royalty. 
 
Lemma 2 







 such that for q £  2 q  the optimal royalty rate is e and for  
q > 2 q  the optimal royalty rate is  
q
q ) )( 1 ( l h A A - -
 < e.  
 
Thus, for q £  2 q , Fl* = 0 and Fh* =  
4
) (
2 e + -c Ah  - 
4
) (
2 c Ah -
 which is the maximum fixed 
fee charged under complete information. Also for q > 2 q , Fl* > 0 and  Fh* is less than the 
complete information fixed fee. In particular when q = 1 then the royalty rate is zero. And 
low type is charged only with the fixed fee equivalent to the entire surplus as it should be like 
under complete information. The above separating contract is the best for the patentee under 
the linear contract scheme we are considering in the present paper.    10 
Also observe that optimal royalty rate 
*
l r  under separating contract is higher than that of 
* r  
in the case of fixed fee plus royalty pooling contract. See figure below. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Now, comparing Eqns.(3) and (6), we state the following lemmas. 
 
Lemma 3 
For all  l r r = , we must have l F F =  and  ( ) ( ) r r l p p > . 
 
Proof:  From (3), note that  ( ) r p  = q (F + r ql(r) ) + (1-q) ( F + r qh(r) )  
where, F = 
4
) (




2 c Al -
 
 From (6), note that  h l l l l l F r q r F r ) 1 ( )] ( [ ) ( q q p - + + =  








2 c Ai -
 
It is easy to see that when  l r r = , then  l F F =  and also  ( ) ( ) l l l r q r q = . Thus, the first term of 
( ) r p  and  ( ) l r p  coincides. Hence remains to show the second term of  ( ) l r p  is bigger than 
second term of  ( ) r p . 
Leaving aside the common term (1- ) q , second term of  ( ) l r p ,  
= h F  Fl +
4
) (




l h r c A - + - e
 
Since, l F F = , it is enough to show 
4
) (




l h r c A - + - e
 >  r qh(r) 
Now putting the value of qh(r) and simplifying, we get:  r
rl - > -
2
, which is true for  l r r =  . 
Hence the result. 
 
Lemma 4 
It is true that   ( )>
*
l r p ( ) ( ) ( ) h
P T r Max q p p - = 1 , .
*  
Proof: First observe that  ( ) ( )
* * r rl p p >  for all q ‡ qˆ. This follows directly from lemma 3.   11 
To show  ( ) ( ) h l T r q p - > 1
*  for all  q q ˆ < . 
Consider a feasible separating contract as follows:  h h l l T F F r = = = , 0 , e .  
Note that this contract is accepted by both types. 
This contract achieves a payoff of  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) h h l l T T q r q q e e q p - > - + + = 1 1 0   
Now since,  ( ) ( ) l l r r p p ‡
*  as 
*
l r is optimal. Hence the result. 
Thus, we state our final proposition. 
 
Proposition 3   
(i)  Expected payoff of the patentee under the separating contract is greater than that 
of fixed fee plus royalty pooling contract. Formally,  ( )
P
l r p p >
*  .  
(ii)  When the licensee offers the technology under separating contract, then for all 
prior belief, the technology is offered to both types of the licensee, hence it is also 
efficient.  
(iii)  The high type of the licensee is always charged with fixed fee. In case of low type 
licensee, for q £  2 q  the optimal royalty rate is e with zero fixed fee and for q > 2 q  
the optimal royalty is less than e and also some fixed fee is charged.  
 
Proof: (i) follows directly from lemma 4.  
(ii) Note that an alternative option of the patentee is to offer licensing contract only to the 
high type (which is actually optimal in the earlier pooling contract under some prior 
belief, see proposition 2 (i)). Using that option the patentee receives  ( ) h T q - 1 . 
However, from lemma 4, we note that  ( )>
*
l r p ( ) ( ) ( ) h
P T r Max q p p - = 1 , .
* ( ) h T q - ‡ 1 . 
So under the separating contract, it is always optimal for the patentee to offer the patent to 
both types of the licensee irrespective of the prior belief. 
(iii) follows from lemma 2 and the discussion after that. 
 
This finding is interesting as it establishes that under adverse selection the optimal licensing 
arrangement can be found with a separating contract. Recall that in the pooling contract with 
royalty, when licensing is offered to both types then, p p ‡
P ; now under separating case,  we 
find that  ( )
P
l r p p >
* , hence the optimal licensing contract for the patentee is a separating 
contract as described above. This optimal contract could involve only fixed fee, only royalty   12 
and a mixture of fixed fee and royalty depending on the parameter configurations.  The 
royalty is never used for the high type of licensee under separating contract and it is used 
only for low type of licensee.8 Also note that unlike the pooling contracts described before 
where both types are offered with new technology over a restricted range of prior belief of the 
patentee, in the separating contract case irrespective of the prior belief of the patentee, new 
technology is always offered to both types.  Thus, the optimal licensing contract is  more 
efficient in nature as compared to the pooling contract case. However, it should be noted here 
that this separating contract is still not the first best contract from the point of view of social 
surplus maximization. The social surplus is maximized when the technology is used for both 
types of demand and production taking place according to the true marginal cost of 
production associat ed with the technology. In the separating contract analyzed above 
although the market is being served in both states of demand but the presence of royalty per 
unit of output distorts the social surplus available in the relationship. Thus we find a second 
best contract from the social welfare point of view with a linear contract scheme. 
  
Corollary 2 (consistency with complete information): 
Observe that under separating contract when q=1 (i.e., the demand is known to be truly low) 
then  0 *= r  and  ( ) l l T r =
* p  ; whereas when  q 0 = (i.e the demand is known to be truly  high) 
then  e =
* r  which implies  0 = l F and hence  h h T F = . 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have considered  a simple model of patent licensing with a feature of adverse 
selection. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of 
cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the 
only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses private information about the market 
demand which is unknown to the patentee except that the patentee has some prior belief 
about it. The patentee has an option to charge a fixed fee, a per unit royalty fee or a mix of 
fixed and royalty fee in order to maximize profit. In a complete information framework of 
this model, the optimal licensing contract would be to charge a fixed fee contingent upon the 
state of demand. But due to asymmetric information, where the licensee has private 
information about the true demand, an adverse selection problem arises. In this scenario, we 
                                                   
8  This finding appears to be consistent with empirical observation in licensing arrangements that 
royalty rate decreases with output (Taylor and Silberston, 1973).   13 
showed that an optimal licensing contract of the patentee is to offer a separating contract, one 
for the low demand type and the other for the high demand type. A low demand type is 
offered with a contract which is either only royalty or a combination of fixed fee and per unit 
royalty and the high demand type is offered with a contract with only fixed fee. We proved 
that the  expected payoff to the patentee from the separating contract is  higher than any 
pooling contract. We also showed that irrespective of the prior belief of the patentee, new 
technology is always offered to both types  under the separating contract. In other words, the 
market is always served by the new technology irrespective of the prior belief of the patentee, 
unlike the pooling contracts where both types are offered with new technology over a 
restricted range of prior belief of the patentee. Thus, the optimal  linear separating licensing 
contract also turned out to be more efficient than an optimal pooling contract. However, the 
optimal separating contract is not the first best contract from the social welfare point of view. 
Nevertheless, this kind of linear scheme is indeed observed in practice.  
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